The University of Chicago

ROUND TABLE

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UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

CAN WE PROTECT AMERICA?

GEORGE F. ELIOT · FRANK KNOX · MAYNARD KRUEGER

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

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Pamphlet Shelves

CAN WE PROTECT AMERICA?*

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT, Former Major in the Military Intelligence Reserve, United States Army

FRANK KNOX, Editor and Publisher, *Chicago Daily News*

MAYNARD C. KRUEGER, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, March 24, 1940, at 1:30 P.M., Central Standard Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

CAN WE PROTECT AMERICA?

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"On June 4, New York's police commissioner ordered the city darkened. Display lights, advertising signs, unnecessary theater illumination were shut off. Tower clocks were taboo. Tall buildings were blacked. The city's citizens lowered their window shades and dimmed their lights. . . . .

"The port of New York was closed. A steel net was stretched across New York harbor narrows. Antiaircraft guns were mounted and manned.

"Instructions were issued for action in case of air attack. Alarm sirens would be sounded. People were instructed to open windows of their homes and offices and go immediately to the basement. The subway would be requisitioned as a shelter. . . . .

"Crowds on Broadway cheered as police forced recalcitrant restaurant proprietors to dim their lights. The police commissioner flew over the city with Army officers looking for violations. He found none. New York was 'an unidentified black patch.' New York was waiting.

*"That was June 4, 1918."**

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MR. KRUEGER: That blackout stuff in New York in June, 1918, was all "hooey," and I think that kind of talk is today; in fact, I suspect it is a part of a propaganda barrage for bigger appropriations for the army and navy. Do you think, Major Eliot, that the problem of protecting America is a problem of blackouts and protection against air raids?

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* *"When New York Blacked Out," by A. Forester and A. J. Russell, Jr., "Collier's," March 30, 1940.*

MR. ELIOT: No, I don't, but I doubt very much whether this is a propaganda barrage. However, the defense of the United States is primarily a matter of the control of sea communications. Any attempt by any foreign power to move into the Western Hemisphere must be made initially by sea. If we can prevent that in the first place we will prevent the whole thing.

MR. KNOX: I notice, in looking over the ROUND TABLE'S correspondence with members of Congress, a letter from my good friend Congressman Harness of Indiana. In the course of his letter he propounds this question, which I think has a very direct bearing on our discussion:

> "If we are not to withdraw within our own borders, how shall our interests be defined? What shall we expect to defend beyond our own borders? What will we actually fight for; and what interests will prompt us to offer active political, diplomatic, and economic support to other nations at war?"

MR. KRUEGER: I wish all the members of the Military and Naval Affairs Committee had sense enough to raise questions like that.

MR. KNOX: This is a brilliant young man who has a great future, I predict, in Congress. His question leads me to this observation: that you cannot intelligently discuss what should be our national program of defense unless you first define what our international policy, our foreign policy, is to be. While I haven't time to go into that at any great length, I should like to suggest that there are certain things which can be somewhat defined as a part of our present national policy.

MR. KRUEGER: You wouldn't say that the United States has anything like a very definite foreign policy at the present time, would you?

MR. KNOX: One is developing. Up to within the last few years

the Monroe Doctrine was probably the only bit of foreign policy *per se* that we had.[1] Since then we have been showing a more intelligent interest in promoting world conditions under which interchange of goods and services may be extended, and I should say that now we are beginning to recognize that interchange of goods and services and friendly relations between nations, maintained in times of peace, constitutes an act of help toward guaranteeing peace. On the ideological side I think we are coming to have a foreign policy which might be described as an active interest in and support for four freedoms.

MR. KRUEGER: Doesn't this sound a bit general, Colonel? You don't think the lineup is going to be on an ideological basis, do you?

MR. KNOX: I think it is going to have something to do with it, especially with whether the public accepts this attitude I am describing. I think our general policy with regard to other nations revolves about the things I have already mentioned: the Monroe Doctrine and the promotion of free interchange of goods, and four freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom from fear. The latter freedom, of course, involves encouragement of the principle of disarmament. Now I think if these were to constitute our foreign policy, in outline, we could go from that point to a more intelligent discussion of how we can make America safe.

MR. ELIOT: In any case, Colonel, I think our military policy

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[1] *The American attitude toward foreign influence and colonization of the Americas was stated by President James Monroe in a message to Congress, December 2, 1823. The message read in part: ". . . . the American continents, ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The full text of the "Monroe Doctrine" is found in the* ROUND TABLE *transcript (No. 83) "International Law—What Is It?"*

can take this stand: that any intelligent and forceful foreign policy must be based primarily on freedom of action, which comes under your heading of freedom from fear. That is, freedom from the fear of direct attack, and if our military policy can be so arranged that we cannot be directly attacked we have a freedom of action for a sound foreign policy. We can meet the exigencies of unforeseen foreign events as they occur.

MR. KRUEGER: Those four freedoms remind me very much of the generalities that President Roosevelt put into his speech to the opening session of Congress last January. I don't see for the life of me how you are going to talk sense about foreign policy in terms of such generalities as that. Certainly the problem of maintaining freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and so on, aren't problems that are basic in the field of foreign policy.

MR. KNOX: They are basic in the kind of world we are going to live in.

MR. KRUEGER: They are basic in matters of domestic policy, but I don't see that the defense of those freedoms is at all a matter of foreign policy. We are interested in the relationship between foreign policy and military policy. We say—and I think Congressman Harness is dead right on this—that you can't talk sense about military policy unless you have something definite to go on in the way of a foreign policy. But I'd like to see our definition of foreign policy considerably more specific than that.

MR. ELIOT: You can't foresee your foreign policy. You don't know what is going to happen. What you do know is that you want to be free to act in the best interests of the American people. We can do that because we have an insular position. We can so implement that with an adequate navy that we cannot be directly attacked, threatened, blackmailed, as nations of Europe have been blackmailed by threats of direct attacks. We can go that far with military policy anyway.

MR. KRUEGER: You are in favor of taking advantage of the insular position of the United States in order to avoid getting involved in any kind of European or Asiatic conflict?

MR. ELIOT: I certainly am!

MR. KRUEGER: Then what are you going to do on the problem of the protection of American interests abroad? Is there anything to be said on that? I'm still afraid that the military and naval strength of the United States is primarily aimed at the protection of American commercial interests in outlying parts of the world.

MR. KNOX: I should say that our foreign policy in national defense is concerned in the protection of American rights wherever they may be found.

MR. KRUEGER: That's a very broad statement. I was in hopes that American policy had gotten away from that somewhat.

MR. ELIOT: The whole history of maritime powers shows that their navies have always been used for the protection of their citizens in times of political turmoil or of great natural disasters abroad and these protections have not customarily been the causes of war.

MR. KRUEGER: It seems to me that what you gentlemen are doing is using the insular position of the United States not in order to avoid the United States having to have a tremendous military and naval equipment but in order to give the United States a protected base on which to operate on the rest of the world in the same old imperialist way that other countries have done.

MR. KNOX: If you choose to call a promotion and interest in the elements in civilization that make for free peoples interference with others, then I'll agree to your thesis, but I do not call it that.

MR. KRUEGER: I am very much interested in elements that make for free peoples, and in freedom of speech and freedom of the press and so on, but I see those things as interests that are not

served particularly well by bayonets or bombing planes or by battleships. If you think that the United States can simply use its insular position in order to build up the strongest military and naval machine in the world, then I should say you are following the worst of the precedents in British and French imperial policy.

MR. ELIOT: The strongest naval force in the world is a necessity to us in the world as it is presently constituted. Unfortunately, we cannot say what world conditions can be. We can protect ourselves and we ought not to abandon the great advantages of our insular position by falling back on methods which would be in the end far more costly to us and far more dangerous.

MR. KNOX: It would mean fighting a war here at home if we don't do that.

MR. ELIOT: Yes.

MR. KRUEGER: You'd agree—wouldn't you, Knox?—that from the economic point of view the United States is in a more invulnerable position that any other country in the world.

MR. KNOX: In respect to self-sufficiency, yes. Unhappily right now with respect to our financial resources I will have to qualify that. I think the huge federal debt under which we are now groaning is a definite weakness in our defense lines. The financial power to make defense effective is one of the most important parts of the national defense program.

MR. KRUEGER: As far as I can tell, the financial power of the United States has not been very seriously impaired. The federal debt is large, yes, but it is not by any means as large as it is for any of the other countries with which the United States might conceivably have to deal on any naval battlefield.

MR. ELIOT: It wouldn't do us any good, however, if we had to undergo the additional debt burden that would be necessitated if



we had to fight another war in Europe or in Asia. We had better confine ourselves to the areas in which we can make our military power felt.

MR. KRUEGER: That makes sense. What are those areas? What does that mean with regard to American naval and military policy?

MR. ELIOT: It means the control of the sea communications of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in the final analysis.

MR. KRUEGER: All of them?

MR. ELIOT: A greater part of them, yes. I don't mean the whole Eastern Pacific adjacent to Asia.

MR. KRUEGER: You mean the protection of the intercoastal trade?

MR. ELIOT I mean the approaches to the Western Hemisphere.

MR. KNOX: It isn't border trade we are interested in. We are interested in avenues of attack against which we must defend ourselves.

MR. KRUEGER: What is the probability of any invasion of Continental United States? That isn't what you are worried about, is it?

MR. ELIOT: While we maintain a navy it is not what we are worried about.

MR. KRUEGER: You mentioned the Western Hemisphere. You believe the defense forces of the United States are to defend the entire Western Hemisphere?

MR. ELIOT: Yes, indeed!

MR. KNOX: I completely agree with that. I think our problem, as Major Eliot has said, is to defend the whole Western Hemisphere; in other words, to provide adequate safety for ourselves. We should do this in cooperation and in closest alliance with other nations in the Western World so that we do not assume to be sort of a paternal protecting force for other independent sovereign nations in the Western World. We must bring them into the picture, as they already are, as allies, and encourage them to provide a defense system of their own which can be combined with ours in the protection of this whole area in the Western Hemisphere.

MR. KRUEGER: That sounds very much like the reasons that Russia gives with regard to her policy in the Baltic, with regard to

Lithuania and Estonia, and even with regard to Finland except that the Finns wouldn't cooperate very well along that line. It sounds very much to me, too, as if the United States is going to follow that kind of policy.[2]

MR KNOX: I can't take you very seriously because the whole thing revolves about objectives, purposes. Even you, I am sure, will agree that there is no resemblance between the purposes of the Russian, Stalin, government and any democratic government America may have had in the past or will have in the future.

MR. KRUEGER: Of course, I find the purposes of armies and navies remarkably similar once they get together and I don't think that we can do very much to set ourselves up as *the* great moral force, by comparison with Japan, for example. If the United States is going to follow this kind of a policy in the whole Western Hemisphere, what complaint do you have about Japan's policy in the Far East? Isn't Japan doing the right thing?

MR. ELIOT: I am not concerned with complaining about Japan's policy in the Far East except as it conflicts with American interests.

MR. KNOX: I complain because it is a direct violation of their pledged word, made a part of the Nine-Power Pact, in which they promised us to preserve and protect and regard the integrity of China.[3]

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[2] *In September and October of last year the Soviet Union signed agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania providing for the establishment of Russian naval and air bases on territory of the three Baltic nations. The demands for similar concessions from Finland resulted in the Russo-Finnish war (December, 1939, to March, 1940) and the winning of these grants by the U.S.S.R.*

[3] *The "Nine-Power Pact" was signed February 6, 1922, by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium,*

MR. ELIOT: Which is one of our interests, and if it conflicts with our interests I'd object to it. There is no use calling names about these things or calling things imperialism or comparing our policy with this country or that. Our policy, as Palmerston once said of British policy, in the last analysis is based on our interests.[4]

MR. KRUEGER: "Our interests"—there are two things that are vague about that phrase. One of them is "our." Who are *we?* I take it you mean the entire Western Hemisphere. But the other is what these interests are. These interests lie all over the world and you are not really talking about protecting the Western Hemisphere then. You are talking about protecting any American interest anywhere.

MR. ELIOT: I decline to be drawn into any such discussion as that. I think we are protecting the Western Hemisphere when we maintain American freedom of action to deal with military situations which may threaten.

MR. KRUEGER: Even if that action takes place in Far Eastern waters?

MR. ELIOT: If the action takes place in Far Eastern waters under conditions which make it necessary for us to act there, then we must act there.

MR. KRUEGER: That simply bears out the good old state-

Portugal, and the Netherlands. The signatories promised to respect and maintain "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

[4] *Viscount Palmerston (1784–1865) was Premier of Great Britain from 1855 to 1865, save for a single year, 1858–1859. From 1830 to 1855 he was Foreign Minister or, if out of office, maintained his position as Foreign-Minister-to-come. He was noted as an advocate of a vigorous, almost militaristic, foreign policy.*

ment that any kind of military or naval action is defensive from the standpoint of those who are carrying it out no matter how offensive it may be from the standpoint of the people on the other side.

MR. KNOX: That is true of its character. What is its ultimate purpose?

MR. KRUEGER: I don't think we are going to be able to get together on that matter of purposes because we aren't concerned—

MR. KNOX: Oh, yes we are!

MR. KRUEGER: . . . . because the United States government hasn't shown any particular concern about democratic governments in other parts of the world, even in countries very close to the United States. We get along very well with the dictator-controlled states in South America, you know—better than with the democratic-controlled states.

MR. ELIOT: Certainly we do, but when it comes to defense or offense the question is whether our policy is aggressive or whether it is concerned with the protection of our own rights, our own interests, and the economic conditions under which we find it best to live. Though our purpose may be defensive when it comes to fighting, it is a well recognized military axiom that very frequently the best means of defending your possessions is to make the enemy consider it no longer worth while to attempt to deprive you of them.

MR. KRUEGER: That's exactly the same kind of a line Hitler has been taking with regard to his action.

MR. ELIOT: Again, I don't believe it is pertinent what action Hitler has been taking. It's the axiom of military history. It's the proof of military experience throughout the centuries. I don't care whether Hitler uses it or Stalin uses it or who uses it. It's a fact.

MR. KRUEGER: All right! I don't think we are going to be able to get together on what the American foreign policy should be.

EUROPE'S AMERICAN POSSESSIONS

KEY:

British	*French*
DUTCH	**Danish**

1. **Greenland**
2. Canada
3. Newfoundland
4. *St. Pierre, Miquelon*
5. Bermuda
6. Bahamas
7. British Honduras
8. Jamaica
9. St. Christopher, Barbuda, Antigua, Dominica
10. *Guadeloupe, Martinique*
11. CURAÇAO, BONAIRE, ARUBA
12. St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados, Grenada, Tobago, Trinidad
13. British Guiana
14. DUTCH GUIANA (SURINAM)
15. *French Guiana*
16. Falkland Islands
17. South Orkneys
18. South Georgia
19. Sandwich Islands

[*Many small islands are not included in this list.*—ED.]

Conceding the point, for the purpose of the discussion, that it includes the protection of the whole Western Hemisphere, I'd like to hear you spell that out a bit further on what that means—first with regard to the army.

MR. KNOX: I think that we would be completely equipped to protect ourselves with a regular army of, say, 300,000 men.

MR. KRUEGER: That's larger than it is now?

MR. KNOX: Slightly. It is 240,000 now. I would add to that as an essential ingredient in our national land defense that the National Guard should be built up to its approved size, which is, I think, about 420,000 men. Am I right, Major?

MR. ELIOT: That's about right.

MR. KNOX: I'm particularly partial to making the National Guard a part of our first line of land defense because it is essentially a citizen army and does not take its members out of civilian life. I should provide—if I had my way about it—for the training of officers for possible expansion of both the regular army and the National Guard in case of emergency.[5]

MR. KRUEGER: To what extent is this National Guard policy of yours accepted by expert military opinion?

MR. KNOX: I don't know. I suspect, however, that in general terms that is the prevailing view in military circles.

MR. KRUEGER: That means, then, a standing army of about 300,000, and a National Guard of 420,000 more. When you list the standing army, that doesn't include the reserve officers, and it doesn't include the regular army reserves.

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[5] *Other officer training agencies include the Citizens Military Training Corps (to a small extent) and, particularly, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, which operates in many high schools and colleges.*

MR. KNOX: The regular army reserve is negligible. There is a very small number of those.

MR. ELIOT: It hardly exists at all at the present moment.

MR. KNOX: You have about 720,000 men as the first line of defense, which, with an adequate navy, is ample.

MR. ELIOT: But I think we must emphasize that we must have armaments for these people. They are not equipped.

MR. KNOX: I am very glad you mentioned that because I think it is one of the most important things that we are now neglecting to do. We haven't got adequate equipment for our regular army—far from it—and we haven't even made a beginning in equipping the National Guard as it should be.[6]

MR. ELIOT: We spend too much time on what the old field service regulations used to call "the hesitating search for the ideal" instead of getting some reasonably good equipment and starting to turn it out.

MR. KRUEGER: That hasn't been—has it?—because there hasn't been enough money appropriated.

MR. KNOX: Yes, indeed it has! Ever since '23 and '24 they have been starving the army in the alleged cause of economy. That kind of economy is a false economy. Now we are presented with a situation of a world at war. All at once we must rush in and spend billions of dollars to make up for the deficiencies growing out of years of neglect.

MR. ELIOT: I have heard of the disarmament policy "by example" which was very strongly put forward by some of our peace advocates. America must show the example—beat our swords into

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[6] *For criticisms in this connection see the article and book by Oswald Garrison Villard listed in the suggested readings on page 23.*

plowshares. The very same people are now criticizing us for trying to make up for the deficiencies which their policy caused.

MR. KRUEGER: I have been hearing a lot of talk lately—particularly from Republican circles—about the fact that relief expenditures and so on have gotten to be greater than the whole cost of government used to be. If I remember my figures correctly, we are spending on the army this year about two hundred million dollars more than the total cost of the federal government in 1916.[7]

MR. KNOX: I am not competent to answer that because I haven't familiarized myself with the figures, but I know this: that the present expenditures for national defense are the direct fruitage of years of failure to make the proper annual appropriation for national defense, and thus we find ourselves—in a moment when the world is on fire—with inadequate defenses against the situation.

MR. ELIOT: Furthermore, those figures don't have any very great application because modern armament is far more costly, far more complicated, far more technical, than it was even twenty or twenty-five years ago by a very long ways.

MR. KRUEGER: But with the increases that you want in the army, it would still be true—wouldn't it?—that the primary problem is the navy.

MR. ELIOT: Yes, indeed!

MR. KRUEGER: And your primary claim for increased funds will come from the navy, won't it?

MR. ELIOT: Not necessarily increased funds. There again you have this disarmament by example. If we had built up the navy by small annual appropriations, adding a few ships each year after the

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[7] *Appropriations for federal government expenses amounted to $1,114,490,000 in the fiscal year of 1916, while 1939–40 total national defense expenditures are estimated at $1,519,488,000.*

World War, we wouldn't have all this trouble today and all these claims of extravagance.

MR. KNOX: You're completely right, Major. I agree with you thoroughly, and I think the weakest spot in our whole twenty years of experience has been our failure to foresee that we might again be presented with the same situation we faced almost helplessly in 1917: a war on our hands and no preparation for it.

MR. KRUEGER: Tell me, Major Eliot, what does this policy of yours call for in the way of naval expansion? You are not fooling with the idea of a two-ocean navy, are you?

MR. ELIOT: I see a letter here from Senator Gillette of Iowa in which he asks whether a proper policy should contemplate a defense by a two-ocean navy or a navy that is to be transferred from one coast to the other, depending upon the point of imminence of attack.

MR. KRUEGER: I have one here from a member of the Naval Affairs Committee of Congress in which he does not raise the question. He says he has been in favor of a two-navy fleet ever since he has been in Congress.

MR. ELIOT: I think that is a mistake. I think Senator Gillette has the right idea here. What you want is one fleet under one command, able to act with concentrated power wherever you require it. The minute you start setting up an Atlantic fleet and a Pacific fleet you are going to find all kinds of political pressure to keep those two fleets separated in war and in peace and that is going to cause you all sorts of trouble.

MR. KNOX: How are you going to take care of all of our necessities with just one fleet based in one place?

MR. ELIOT: You have a central position and you can move it from one place to another whenever you require it.

MR. KNOX: I asked that question to bring out your view of the importance of the Panama Canal in our whole scheme of naval defense.

MR. ELIOT: It is indeed the keystone of our naval strategy and there is no question about it that we ought to put every effort into its defense that we possibly can.

MR. KNOX: Do you favor the construction of a third set of locks?[8]

MR. ELIOT: Immediately!

MR. KRUEGER: What about the islands held by the British and French and Dutch down in the Caribbean?[9] You are going to take these over, I suppose.

MR. KNOX: As far as I am concerned I'll admit it's a rather radical idea—but I would initiate discussions with Great Britain and

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[8] *The construction of an additional set of locks to supplement the two existing ones has been proposed as a measure to strengthen the Panama Canal; other proposals include general increase (in quantity and quality) of shore defenses and the building of a second canal across Nicaragua.*

[9] *The Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and Trinidad are held, with many other smaller ones, by Great Britain. Guadeloupe, Martinique, and other lesser islands are held by the French, and the Curaçao group is owned by the Dutch. In addition to these Caribbean islands, Great Britain exercises sovereignty over Bermuda, Newfoundland, British Guiana, British Honduras, and the Dominion of Canada. France has a group of small islands (St. Pierre and Miquelon) just off the southern coast of Newfoundland and French Guiana in addition to the Caribbean possessions listed above. The Dutch (besides the Curaçao group) rule Dutch Guiana (Surinam). In the South Atlantic Great Britain possesses the Falkland Islands lying some 350 miles to the east of the eastern entrance to the Straits of Magellan at the tip of South America.*

France and the Netherlands at once for the transfer of the sovereignty of those islands in the West Indies to ourselves.

MR. KRUEGER: Those islands are down there around our particular territories—Cuba and Puerto Rico. Why does the United States need any more bases down there?[10]

MR. ELIOT: They need another base at Trinidad in the southern end of that string of islands.

MR. KNOX: They need airplane bases along the line, and submarine bases. We want the Caribbean Sea off Central America so well defended and so well protected that it will be fatal for any foreign fleet to find itself inside its confines.

MR. ELIOT: Furthermore, that is a central position in the Atlantic from which our fleet can move either south or north as the case may be.

MR. KNOX: Or through the Canal into the Pacific.

MR. ELIOT: It is our lake and it has to be so because it is the key, as Admiral Mahan once said, to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.[11]

MR. KRUEGER: I think you are making out a good case for Japanese policy in the Far East, because this policy you are laying out in the Caribbean sounds very much like Japan's policy in Far Eastern waters.

MR. KNOX: It is as different as white is from black. Japan is trying to take physical possession of a friendly nation to develop it for Japanese interest. What we are trying to do is to protect

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[10] *Besides those maintained on its own territory, the United States has a naval coaling station at Guantánamo in eastern Cuba.*

[11] *Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914), recognized as one of America's greatest naval tacticians.*

the whole Western World from attack from abroad. We don't want any part of it. We don't want to interfere with their domestic affairs. We would like to promote their prosperity in every way we can and we don't covet an inch of their land or their coast.

MR. KRUEGER: It does seem a bit odd to me, though, in following out that policy—with your eye particularly on the totalitarian powers you were referring to—that you have to take these territories from countries that are supposed to be your friends: from Britain and France and the Netherlands.

MR. ELIOT: We will get them by peaceful negotiations. Nobody is proposing to seize them.

MR. KNOX: Unless Germany wins the war. The first measure we will take in the event Germany wins will be to seize those islands. We couldn't possibly let them fall into German hands.

MR. KRUEGER: What about the British and the French and the Dutch territories that are on the mainland? You wouldn't let them go, would you?

MR. ELIOT: Not into German hands certainly.

MR. KNOX: It's merely an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, that is all.[12] We would have to maintain the Monroe Doctrine more than ever if Germany became dominant in Europe.

MR. ELIOT: What would Brazil think of it, for example, if we allowed, let us say, Surinam, Dutch Guiana, to fall into the hands of

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[12] *This extension of the Monroe Doctrine to cover the possibility of transfer of territory in the Americas was made by President Polk in a special message to Congress with reference to Yucatan, April 29, 1848: "Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure, with a view to the acquisition of the 'dominion and sovereignty' over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European Power."*

the Germans and be used for German propaganda and pressure against Brazil?

MR. KRUEGER: They are quite likely to think, if the United States goes in with that policy of yours, that the United States is reverting to the good old policy, which has never been completely abandoned, of maintaining strict control in South and Central America. To me, that is exactly the kind of policy that has put the world in the bad fix it is in today.

MR. KNOX: I would recommend, to cure that mistaken notion of yours, that you go to South America—particularly to Brazil—and learn what the actual attitude there is. There is no country in the world more cooperative with us in our program of defense of the Western World than Brazil.

MR. ELIOT: We have just had a visit from the Brazilian Chief of Staff. We have a naval mission in Brazil; we have a military mission in Brazil, and we are getting the most complete cooperation from the Brazilian government.

MR. KRUEGER: I realize your interest in this South American question. I don't know that it is enough to pound the table about. This isn't the Republican National Convention. But let's take a look for just a moment at what this means in regard to the air force defending the Western Hemisphere. Does it call for a bigger air force or smaller one, or is the one we have now adequate?

MR. ELIOT: I think the present army and navy objectives are quite adequate, except in so far as we may require some additional shipboard airplanes for the scouting force.

MR. KNOX: There is one thing that I would like to emphasize. Our gravest need in the matter of air force is not in actual number of planes in commission. Our grave need is for the capacity to produce them in quantity when needed.

MR. ELIOT: That's correct.

MR. KNOX: It is much better for us not to have too large a fleet of airships and have the capacity to produce the latest models on demand.

MR. ELIOT: And also to be able to produce flying personnel rapidly.

MR. KRUEGER: That means, of course, that you would want to continue selling planes to Britain and France or anybody else that will buy them in order to keep our factories in operation?

MR. KNOX: It is to our selfish interest to do so.

MR. ELIOT: Yes, indeed!

MR. KRUEGER: That is certainly the policy that is being followed. Whether you are going to work out a naval policy that will make sense without a foreign policy more definite than the one we now have is a question that we haven't settled.

SUGGESTED READINGS

DAVIS, GEORGE T., *A Navy Second to None.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1940. *A historical development of American naval policy, integrating certain fundamental ideas of American foreign policy.*

DRAKE, F. V., "The Air Force We Need," *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1940. *Urging that air power is vital to American needs and can best be handled by the establishment of a central air authority; includes a general summary of the American air problem.*

ELIOT, GEORGE FIELDING, *The Ramparts We Watch.* New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1938. *A comprehensive survey of American military and naval policy.*

———, *Bombs Bursting in Air.* New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939. *A brief commentary on aerial warfare today.*

FLYNN, JOHN T., "Whom Are We Getting Ready to Fight?" *New Republic*, January 22, 1940. *Pointing out that our national defense appropriations for 1940–41 are over two billion dollars, the author asks: "Against whom is this enlarged military power to be directed?"*

"Should We Increase Our Air Force, Army, Navy?" *Fortune*, December, 1939. *The Fortune magazine survey report on opinions of Americans about national defense.*

VILLARD, OSWALD GARRISON, *Our Military Chaos.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939. *Inefficiency and undemocratic sentiment hampers the American military system according to this well-known liberal leader, and our defense policy lacks co-ordination and a sense of fundamental policy.*

———, "Investigate the Army!" *American Mercury*, April, 1940. *Urges an inquiry into the operations of our army and an investigation into the charges made against it.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. Control of what avenue of attack will be the surest guarantee of American security, in the estimation of Major Eliot? Page 2.

2. What are the "four freedoms" suggested by Colonel Knox as the basis of American foreign policy? Page 4.

3. How would America compare with other nations in regard to self-sufficiency in time of war? Page 7.

4. What American defense policy is compared by one of the speakers to Russia's negotiations with the Baltic states? Pages 9–10.

5. What is the size of the regular American army today? Page 14.

6. If extended to its "approved size" what would be the full strength of the National Guard? Page 15.

7. How do military appropriations today compare with total federal expenditures in 1916? Page 16.

8. What argument is used to defend the policy of a single navy in opposition to a two-ocean navy? Page 17.

9. What European powers own territory in the Western Hemisphere? Name several of these territories. Pages 13 and 18.

10. What recent events indicate close military cooperation between the United States and Brazil? Page 21.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 23.

*

1. What factors must be considered in estimating the likelihood of foreign invasion of America? Discuss the possibilities in terms of these factors.

2. Do you agree that America should take steps to negotiate for the cession of European-held territory in the New World, or at least for the establishment of American bases on some of the Atlantic islands over which European powers exercise sovereignty? Argue for or against the thesis that such a procedure by America would be similar to Russia's demands for naval bases in the Baltic from Finland, or to the Japanese demands upon China.

3. Discuss the relative importance of the three branches of national defense forces: air, land, and sea. How large a force in each of these divisions would you recommend? How could they be equipped?

4. Consider the rate at which certain modern military equipment (guns and aircraft) become old fashioned. In view of these facts, to what extent should America's defense forces be equipped?

5. Should defense appropriations be increased or decreased in view of (1) the internal needs of the nation; (2) the comparative military status of the United States among other nations; (3) the present state of world affairs?

The Capitol Comments . . . .

The best qualified authorities on America's defense needs are the Washington representatives of every American citizen. To a distinguished group of these men, the Radio Office at the University of Chicago directed the question: "Can We Defend America?" The following pages contain a cross-section of their opinions.

*

"Not One Corps"

One of the principal fallacies of the Army and Navy program today, in my opinion, is the fact that we are basing the entire program on an invasion of the United States, rather than a defense designed to halt an invasion of the country. I think I am safe in saying that no high ranking officer of either the Army or the Navy, or any high official in government circles, can today define what the Army and Navy are supposed to do in the event of an emergency

My answer to your subject question, "Can We Protect America?" is that America is in no danger of invasion and that this talk of invasion is merely a New Deal spur-jingling, saber-rattling program. I could furnish quotes from many of our Army and Navy experts to the effect that an invasion of the United States by any European or Asiatic power is out of the question. One quotation, from a recent witness before an Executive Session of the House Military Affairs Committee, is "If all the nations of Europe combined to invade the United States, and had full control of the high seas, they could not land a corps of troops on American shores." This statement was made by a high-ranking officer of the General Staff of the Army.

PAUL W. SHAFER
House Committee on
Military Affairs

*

Reason and Patience

America can, of course, protect herself, but the American government should carry on in such a way that she may never have to. If the world is to be run by individuals who accept only the theory of might and who therefore might attempt to put into practice that theory on us, we must be prepared to withstand attack. If the world is to be run by individuals who believe in self-restraint, then of course we need the minimum of protection. In time of war like the present—with war in both the Pacific and the Atlantic—we should be prepared to use any means to see that the war does not come to us.

America's military theory as prac-

ticed today is in keeping with George Washington's theory that we need a good army, not a large one. The army now means army, navy, and air force. Since war today means even more than army, navy, and air force, the thoughtful persons who plan for any emergency will see that our people are prepared industrially, socially, and economically to withstand war, if necessary. Thus our planning could all be turned to this end without in any sense being militaristic. Are our finances able to expand? Is our industry able to convert? Are our people schooled to that patience which will allow only the prepared and the necessary to be called to the colors?

I do not believe that war is coming to us, but if it should come let us not make the mistake we made in 1917 by rushing pell-mell into a war standard without being prepared for it. Probably more soldiers were lost in getting them under the colors than were lost be enemy bullets. Probably more damage was done to our economic life by emotional actions than by the actualities of war. America's war losses in numbers were in no sense comparable with our pension list. This merely means that many were uselessly and needlessly called, and that of course came primarily because America fought the war emotionally instead of in accordance with reasoned plans. That is why I stress patience. It is hard to keep a nation patient when every individual in the nation feels that he should do his part.

ELBERT D. THOMAS
Senate Committee on Education and Labor

Dangerous to Democracy

Although I have been a student of military matters for thirty-five years, saw service in the World War, and have served on the House Committee on Military Affairs for seven years, I can only say that this proposition is so gigantic and so fraught with many possibilities and probabilities which cannot be foreseen, that until a concrete proposition is at hand I could not attempt to answer in the manner you desire.

If you will pardon my saying so, I believe you people with such propositions are just about as dangerous to democracy as a foreign enemy. Of course you mean well, but the danger is that the people will too eagerly seize upon what you produce as something upon which to base a policy of national defense. You know we are a democracy, and the great weakness of a democracy in time of war is too well known to necessitate any comment. It is indeed unfortunate that the United States seems to be filled with great numbers of otherwise intelligent and well meaning people who will gravely and confidently presume to set themselves up as authorities on matters of national defense and reach a conclusion, by some process of mental legerdemain, which the officials of our Army and Navy, with their years of actual experience and professional studies, would have difficulty in reaching.

I have never believed that the government of the United States could properly be conducted in the manner of an overgrown New England town meeting (which town meetings,

by the way, I believe have been generally discontinued); neither do I believe it can be conducted by the backseat driving of Father Coughlins, Dr. Townsends, John Lewis', Liberty Leaguers, United States Chambers of Commerce, or other volunteer guardians of the national welfare. Every two years an election is held, and a Congress is elected to legislate for the nation. Questions arise which require a great deal of study, thought and research, as well as free discussion among those who are elected by the people to do this legislating. I do not believe our government can properly be conducted with constant pressure from the minorities which are organized, not in the interest of the United States as a whole, but, more often than not, to promote the personal ambitions of the organizer.

Now if you are concerned about national defense, that is one thing; but if you are looking for a radio program, that is another. Of course this is a nation of free speech, and free press. The above is my contribution.

CHAS. I. FADDIS
House Committee on
Military Affairs

*

Define Objectives

I believe we can protect America, and that our first responsibility is to determine what we mean by "national defense" from a naval point of view. We should more closely define the area we expect to defend; and, as long ago as six months, I advocated that a commission be selected, which would make a thoroughgoing study of this problem. Considerable attention was given to this at that time, but nothing definite has, as yet, developed.

Before we go ahead to spend vast sums of money, we should more clearly define our objectives.

JAMES J. DAVIS
Senate Committee on Finance

*

Western Defense

Briefly, I feel that the national defense policy should be to keep to the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line as our western limit. Any development beyond this line should be in the form of unfortified advanced bases. On this line Hawaii is pretty adequately fortified, and the projects completed and authorized will make it about as impregnable as human ingenuity can conceive. Alaska is sadly lacking, and needs immediate attention. Panama, while not as weak as Alaska, is in some aspects more vulnerable, and also needs reinforcements in every military branch. Legislation pending or proposed would correct these two weak spots. I can only suggest that these measures should be accelerated in every way possible

SAMUEL WILDER KING
Delegate from Hawaii

*

Hostile Ideologies, Too

If we are not to withdraw within our own borders, how shall our interests be defined? What shall we expect

o defend beyond our own borders? What will we actually fight for; and what interests will prompt us to offer active political, diplomatic and economic support to other nations at war?

These phases of the question are, of course, complex and difficult; but they certainly are a proper part of the problem of national defense unless we are to follow a completely isolationist policy.

We are actually struggling with these phases in our relations with the warring nations at present. It is all out universal opinion that our larger interests are vitally involved; but we are far from a decision as to what our course should be. Accepting the conclusion that our interests, as well as our sympathies, are with the Allies, how far are we to go, or how far should we go, in protecting those interests?

We agree to sell weapons on a title and carry basis, but throw discouraging restrictions upon Allied purchasing, even beyond the original restraints. We refuse to release our best and most up-to-date weapons, reserving those for our own Army and Navy. But may this not be short-sighted, as in the instance of fighting planes, where such rapid advancements are being made that a currently best model becomes second- and third-rate almost before it is well into production? If our interests are actually with the Allies, don't we probably serve those interests both immediately by relaxing the restraints on armaments, and ultimately by training production facilities which will better supply our own forces?

We have tried to forestall as far as possible the overrapid expansion of armament production, fearing the repercussions following the coming of peace. To this end we have placed further restraints upon foreign purchasers by including in their first purchases of munitions the costs of tooling up our industries to produce the order. Since we are planning industrial surveys and industrial mobilization devised to provide adequate equipment and supplies, this would seem to contribute toward the desired end. Are we, however, defeating our own immediate interests by handicapping the Allies? Should we recognize these Allied purchases frankly as promoting our immediate interests, and accordingly set up some compensations for the ultimate repercussions we fear, as an immediate responsibility?

Unfortunately, also, we cannot limit the question of defense to purely military and economic considerations. The spread of ideologies hostile to our political philosophy hastens as the attritions of war continue. There are as many interesting speculations in this phase of the question as in any other. Probably the implications are much more serious.

We must first outline a clear course and a definite goal in the broad field of foreign relations before we can hope to resolve the question of national defense.

FOREST A. HARNESS

House Committee on
Military Affairs

Cheap Insurance

Ever since I have been a member of Congress, and a member of the naval committee, I have advocated two naval fleets, both in the air and on the sea—one on the Pacific coast and one on the Atlantic coast. Each fleet should be equal to the fleet of any one nation, sufficient to protect our shores from invasion. I feel that this is cheap insurance at any price.

LEONARD W. SCHUETZ
House Committee on
Naval Affairs

Prepare

*

Yes, I think we can protect America, and I believe that's what we are going to get a chance to do, and do it alone.

We should certainly be awake to the implications of the possible victories by Hitler and his allies in Europe, and if they are victorious, this country will be an armed camp, out of necessity. We can imagine Mr. Hitler sitting down at the conference table, after he has won a victory—and he has a fifty-fifty chance to do so—saying to England and France, "I'll take your fleet." Don't think they'll get a chance to scuttle [the fleets], as the Germans did, because Mr. Hitler will serve notice on them beforehand that there'll be no scuttling of fleets. If there is, everybody goes up against the wall at daybreak, so there'll be no scuttling of the fleets. Then he'll say to England, "I'll take Canada." Or maybe that will be a little bit too big an administrative proposition, and he'll say instead, "I'll take Bermuda (at the door of New York), the Bahama Islands (off the coast of Florida and two hours' flight to the heart of America), Jamaica (at the mouth of the Panama Canal), and I'll have enough bases to make the United States sit up and take notice."

How would we like to have Hitler as a neighbor, based in these places, where the British have lived for years without a single gun pointed at our shore?

I don't expect Hitler to come over here tomorrow, or the day after he might win a victory, but he'll certainly put himself in a position where he can dictate to the greatest democracy on the face of the earth, whose form of government he loathes.

The challenge will come on the Monroe Doctrine, and sooner or later we'll have the opportunity to defend this hemisphere. It will not be an easy task, with the enemy ruling the waves, even though those waves do span the space of three thousand miles, for it must be remembered that he'll be basing right at our very door and probably have other bases in Mexico and Central America.

On the other hand, if the Allies should win, the necessity of defense would be lessened and, of course, our problem simplified.

It seems to me it would be criminal for us not to take cognizance of a Hitler victory and the possibility of having to defend our shores, if he were victorious. The way things are developing now, it looks like we are going to get a chance to meet Mr. Hitler alone, but he will not be alone.

SHERMAN MINTON
Senate Committee on
Military Affairs

Offense

Many of us feel that some of the expenditures for national defense are not for defense but for offense. Of course, this does cause fear among many who do not want to be involved in a foreign war. We know that the foreign policies dictate the type of navy we need to a large extent.

RUSH D. HOLT
Senate Committee on
Mines and Mining

*

Defense Against Invasion

Even though America is not today prepared for a war of any kind either in funds or material, I firmly believe that we can and will protect America against any invasion or encroachment from without. It seems to me that our greatest danger lies in an unbalanced and poorly managed economic situation internally which in turn may lead those in power to venture into dangerous foreign entanglements in the hope either of helping us or at least causing our citizenry to take their attention off the many failures in our domestic economy. We cannot possibly overestimate the dangers to our entire governmental structure that would result from our involvement in another war.

For the foregoing reasons, I sincerely hope we can content ourselves with staying home and minding our own business and with the building up of our defenses to the minimum need for adequate defense against invasion by any foreign power that may be so foolish as to think we are vulnerable while following that policy.

THOS. E. MARTIN
House Committee on
Military Affairs

*

Only for Defense

I do not believe that the people of the country want us to enter and compete in the international arms race. But I do think that we must expand, modernize, and equip ourselves well enough to defend our shores adequately from outside aggression.

There's an old saying that it isn't the size of the dog in a fight that counts, but rather the size of the fight in the dog. I think that that applies to our army. We have the largest peacetime standing army that this country has ever had. The problem now is not to expand it, but to modernize, properly equip, and train it. If expansion is needed to keep up with the times, it is in the field of our National Guard and the Reserves upon whom we would be obliged to call in case of war. With the rapidly developing use of aircraft, we must keep pace in aviation and develop our research facilities for better employment of this very vital arm of our services. If America is to prepare for the possibility of war, let us build our defenses for the only kind of a war in which America should ever again engage—a war of defense of our shores against outside aggression. The navy has always been our first line of defense, but in view of the revelations of the present European War, there is much

question as to the advisability of building 50- to 70-thousand-ton vessels as a defense factor.

You may be assured that until there is more conclusive evidence than has yet been presented, that, as far as I am concerned, our people's funds will be spent only for defense. Let us look to the better fortification of Panama before we worry about fortifying the little island of Guam. Let us have more anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon research of the very mobile type to equip the men we already have before we spend our money half-training new men that haven't the proper weapons to use when they *are* trained.

STYLES BRIDGES
Senate Committee on
Appropriations

*

Efficiency

It is my firm conviction that we can defend America against foreign aggression through the maintenance of an adequate Navy, one equal in size to any other Navy in the world and one that is maintained in a state of high efficiency. Through our own purchases and our export trade, aircraft production in this country increased tremendously and facilities are and will be adequate to take care of our needs in aircraft should any national emergency arise.

Our small Army should be made as efficient as possible and together with the National Guard should have opportunity of maneuvering in divisions, corps, and armies. If funds are provided for such training and also the equipping of the initial protective force with the most modern weapons, then through co-operation of sea, land, and air forces, I doubt that we could be successfully attacked by any expeditionary force that might be sent against us.

Of course, the Panama Canal should be made as nearly invulnerable as possible, the War Department should increase the efficiency of its industrial mobilization, additional educational orders should be given and ample money spent upon research and development works. In materiel, we must keep abreast or a step ahead of the foreign developments.

DOW W. HARTER
House Committee on
Military Affairs

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IS THERE ANY SENSE TO THE CENSUS?

of

LOUIS WIRTH, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

J. FREDERICK DEWHURST, Economist, Twentieth Century Fund, New York City

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